The Other Bomb







Chip Kendrick
US History
May 2, 1994












	Surely the U.S. bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 ranks among the top ten issues 
most looked into and back upon by historians.  No high school U.S. History course could do 
without it as an essay topic.  Yet with the all the what-ifs about Hiroshima, an equally 
catastrophic event that occurred 3 days later is virtually overlooked: the bombing of Nagasaki.  
Many people have argued the pros and cons of the U.S. bombing of Hiroshima until blue in the 
face, yet few, by comparison, have looked into the decision that went into Nagasaki.  The 
consensus of historians on the bombing of Hiroshima seems to be that the U.S. did the right 
thing for the wrong motives: shortened the war out of a need for cheap revenge.  On Nagasaki 
there is no similar consensus.  Looking into the issue of whether the U.S. should have bombed 
Nagasaki, I have found not only a total dearth of communication between top military officials 
and concerned scientists, but the following of a relentless and outdated timetable leading to the 
same kind of destruction that irreversible military timetables led to in World War I.  The 
attitudes of the people in charge of making the decisions were blatantly revenge-oriented, and 
the Japanese were given no time to respond to Hiroshima before being pounded at Nagasaki.  
While the bombing of Hiroshima may well have ended World War II, the bombing of Nagasaki 
was purposeless killing and misguided revenge.
	First of all the enormity of the Nagasaki bombing should be put forward, in light of the 
fact that while it is common knowledge that the atom bomb dropped on Hiroshima killed more 
people than the bomb dropped on Nagasaki, it is not so well known how small the difference 
was.  In addition, the scale of the destruction caused by the bomb must be examined before the 
decision itself can be criticized.  The bomb dropped on Hiroshima ( called Little Boy ) killed 
135,000 people with its initial blast and heat radiation wave.  The bomb on Nagasaki ( called Fat 
Man ) killed only 70,000 because it was over 1 and a half miles off target.  A large part of the 
killing that each bomb did was in irradiating victims and in starving people after each city's 
infrastructure collapsed, and this percentage of the deaths is not included in the blast figures.  
The damage to city infrastructure caused by the Nagasaki bomb ended up starving fewer people 
than the damage caused by the Hiroshima bomb because it was further from the city's center, but 
the Nagasaki bomb killed more people by radiation because it struck on the outskirts of 
population centers.  The overall number of people killed by Fat Man is still usually estimated as 
less than the number killed by Little Boy, but most estimates put the figures close.  A very few 
estimations say that Fat Man killed a few thousand more people than Little Boy, all told.      The 
Nagasaki bomb was never intended to be second fiddle, nor was it anything less than a full scale 
punitive strike.
	In addition, Fat Man was actually made with a different radioactive metal than Little 
Boy, plutonium as opposed to Little Boy's uranium.  Only about a 20th of the amount of uranium 
needed to achieve critical mass is required of plutonium to create a nuclear explosion, and only 
about a 20th of the amount was used.  Still, plutonium is a great deal more volatile, and the 
Nagasaki bomb turned out to have a greater blast effect, stronger heat radiation, and stronger 
residual radiation as well.  Scientists knew of this difference beforehand, but no government 
official is on record as referring to it, including Truman himself. 
	Finally there are the horror stories, the details of what the atomic bomb did to Nagasaki 
that should be mentioned in order to understand what was decided upon.  Within the radius of 
total destruction by shock wave were two hospitals and a grade school.  People out in the open in 
this radius were incinerated by heat, people indoors were crushed.  Those too far away to be 
killed by shock wave or immediately incinerated were burnt to death, and those too far to be 
killed by the heat wave had burnt skin hanging off their bodies in bleeding flaps, even where 
they had been wearing clothing ( which was seared off ).  Many people injured in this way tried 
to get to the city's rivers to cool off, and most of those who made it died there, weakened in the 
cold water after trying to swim upstream between two fiery banks.    
	The Nagasaki bomb killed primarily civilians, and was nearly as devastating as the 
Hiroshima bomb.  In addition, as far as intent is concerned, the Nagasaki bomb probably would 
have outdone the Hiroshima bomb had it been on target.
	One argument made as an excuse for the U.S. decision to drop the bomb was that no one 
realized just how powerful the bomb would be, and that we had no idea that there would be 
radiation effects.  First of all, in terms of understanding the sheer blast of the bomb, U.S. 
scientists did run a test at Alamogordo on July 16, 1945, slightly less than three weeks before we 
dropped a second bomb on Hiroshima.  The blast reminded William L. Laurence of the New 
York Times of God's command, "Let there be light!"   Laurence was several miles distant from 
ground zero.  Estimates made at the time of the bomb's power were in range of 10-20 thousand 
tons of TNT, and the correct value was confirmed to be about 20,000 tons before the first bomb 
was dropped.   As far as radiation is concerned, here is an excerpt from Atomic Energy, The 
official report on the development of the atomic bomb, written by a consultant on the Manhattan 
Project:

"
Health Hazards
2.32.  It had been known for a long time that radioactive materials were dangerous.  They give 
off very penetrating radiations - gamma rays - which are much like X-rays in their physiological 
effects.  They also give off beta and alpha rays which, although less penetrating, can still be 
dangerous.  The amounts of radium used in hospitals and in ordinary physical measurements 
usually comprise but a few milligrams.  The amounts of radioactive material produced by the 
fission of uranium in a relatively small chain-reacting system may be equivalent to hundreds or 
thousands of grams of radium.  A chain-reacting system also gives off intense neutron radiation 
known to be comparable to gamma rays as regards health hazards.  Quite apart from its 
radioactive properties, uranium is poisonous chemically.  Thus nearly all work in this field is 
hazardous - particularly work on chain reactions and the resulting radioactive products." 

This report was released directly after the first atomic bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima, 
before any of the physiological effects of fission bombs had been directly studied, yet it details 
all the ways in which the fission bomb can do physiological damage aside from the blast and the 
heat wave.  If someone needed even more direct proof of U.S. knowledge of fission bomb side 
effects, they could have talked to one of the radiation monitors present at Alamogordo, Dr. 
Joseph O. Hirschfelder, who, exploring the area of the testing grounds, discovered a completely 
paralyzed mule about 25 miles from ground zero. 
	U.S. scientists knew almost exactly what they could expect the atom bomb to do to 
Hiroshima or any other Japanese target.  If the governmental officials did not, this is not an 
excuse at all: it is an example of the poor information flow that occurred in the U.S. government 
in the decision to bomb both Nagasaki and Hiroshima.
	While we're on the horrors of war, lets give the Japanese a fair share of the blame.  This 
is an account from the U.S. Ambassador to Japan who was captured on Japanese soil 
immediately after the Pearl Harbor surprise attack, describing the tortures some of his fellow 
captives endured over their eight months of captivity:

"That same American [ referring to an earlier account ] told me that once while he was lying tied 
on the ground, a Japanese had ground his boot sole into his face and then had brutally kicked 
him, smashing a rib.  When he was finally untied, he could barely stand and he said he feared 
that a rib had been broken.  One of Japanese police asked where the broken rib was and began to 
feel his body.  As the Japanese came to the broken bone he said, 'Is that the place?' and when the 
man answered, 'Yes,' the policeman hauled off with his fist and hit that broken rib as hard as he 
could ... There were many, many other cases.
	I had heard indirectly of the horrible atrocities perpetrated in the rape of Nanking and of 
the fearful things done in Hong Kong when soldiers who had been taken as prisoners of war 
were bayoneted to death.  But on shipboard we had direct evidence, ... " 

Certainly such a description is capable of inciting a great deal of anger toward Japan in general -  
yet we must in deciding whether the Nagasaki bomb should have been dropped gauge its exact 
effect and not view it as simply a strike against the Japanese.  The Nagasaki bomb could never 
have hurt the Japanese police, yet retribution for torture such as the above was the motivation for 
the bomb.  After report of a successful attack on Hiroshima came into Washington, a General 
Marshall warned against crowing victory with 'too much gratification' in light of the obviously 
heavy Japanese civilian casualties.  General Groves, military head of the Manhattan Project, 
wrote in his memoirs: "I replied that I was not thinking so much about those [ Japanese ] 
casualties as I was about the men who had made the Bataan death march".   Groves was later 
instrumental in pushing the date of the Nagasaki bombing from August 20 to August 9. 
	Other important military leaders had rather skewed outlooks on the destructive nature of 
Atomic bomb.  Secretary of War Stimson, speaking to newly inaugurated Truman: "within four 
months we shall in all probability have completed the most terrible weapon ever known in 
human history, one bomb of which could destroy a whole city.  The world will eventually be at 
the mercy of such a weapon."   The only word used in this phrase that could make it sound 
anything but an imperial dream is 'terrible'.  It seems to me that the tone of the rest of the phrase 
strips 'terrible' of its usual connotation and makes it sound something more like 'powerful'.  
There is no guilt here, and certainly no mention of the loss of human life.
	Yet neither Groves nor Stimson made the final decision on when bombs would be 
dropped: that was left to President Truman.  After having decided drop the bomb and watched it 
happen, Truman referred his critics to his philosophy:  "Worry is often the interest on a debt that 
never comes due.  I can't afford to worry.  I am a simple man."   Certainly an admirable trait in 
your typical president, yet probably not the kind of thing you'd want the man at the button to say.  
Truman also seems to have been motivated by revenge.  On receiving a telegram from a religious 
leader opposing further use of the atomic bomb, Truman replied:

" Nobody is more disturbed over the use of the atomic bomb than I am, but I was greatly 
disturbed over the unwarranted attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor and their murder of our 
prisoners of war.  The only language they seem to understand is the one we have been using to 
bombard them.  When you have to deal with a beast you have to treat him as a beast... " 

The token offer of regret in the first sentence of this phrase is overshadowed not only by 
Truman's later racial slur, but by his later statement of no regrets.
	So we see the men making the decisions made them out of a need for revenge.  Even 
when on the lookout for public relations problems, they can't help but state their true 
motivations.
	Finally we must gauge whether the decision to drop the Nagasaki bomb, made for the 
wrong reasons or not, had the effect it was later attributed with: ending the war.  I spoke earlier 
of the effect of each of atomic bombs dropped on the cities' infrastructures.  With all 
communications lines to outside severed, no one in Hiroshima could possibly tell the outside 
world what kind of devastation the bomb had caused, at least not until someone had actually 
driven into the city, seen the damage, and driven back, or a survivor had wandered to a nearby 
city or outpost.  Considering the planning ahead of drop time that had to go into the Nagasaki 
bombing, we gave them about 2 days to understand the full implications of the American's new 
weapon, to decide on surrender, and to inform us of it.
	In fact we never even really gave them those two days.  The entire time, the second bomb 
was being assembled and the target picked.  This is the irreversibility I mentioned earlier.  From 
Day One, Before Hiroshima and After:

"... Groves tactfully kept in touch with Generals Spatz, LeMay, and the other Air Force 
commanders on Guam, but president Truman and the civilian authorities in Washington were no 
longer included in the decision making circuit.  No one ever considered the options of delaying a 
second bomb and reviewing the decision to continue atomic assaults.  Once the President had 
decided on July 25 that future bombs were to be dropped 'as soon as made ready,' no further 
civilian involvement was contemplated or necessary.  The bombs were to be kept coming 
automatically." 

Clearly here Groves is shown hurrying the Nagasaki bombing and running the old trick of not 
asking for a conformation of a previous order that he wants to follow.  Yet we cannot place the 
blame completely on Groves: no one on the government level ever looked into when other 
bombs would be dropped, something they definitely should of done.  It is extremely unlikely this 
neglect was accidental in every case:  it is more likely that many of those who could have looked 
into the bombing schedule agreed with the previous order, and most of them for the same reason 
Groves did: they wanted revenge.  In addition, Groves tended to stop any dissention from below.  
Kenneth Nichols, a soldier and trained engineer who worked with groves from the beginning of 
the Manhattan Project, describes his overbearing quality:

"He's the biggest sonovabitch I've ever met in my life, but also one of the most capable 
individuals.  He had an ego second to none, he had tireless energy - he was a big man, a heavy 
man but he never seemed to tire.  He had absolute confidence in his decisions and he was 
absolutely ruthless in how he approached a problem to get it done.  But that was the beauty of 
working for him - that you never had to worry about the decisions being made or what it 
meant." 

	Despite all the evidence presented that decisions were made badly, if the Nagasaki bomb 
had the effect of shortening the war, that would still be something.  Unfortunately it did not.
	Emperor Hirohito of Japan, having just heard about the annihilation of Hiroshima, not yet 
knowing anything about the bomb's side effects, speaking on August 6: "No matter what happens 
to me, we must put an end to this war as soon as possible.  This tragedy must not be repeated."   
Tradition in Japan, however, would have the Emperor's military advisors concur before the 
decision actually came through.  Among these advisors, there was considerable dissent.  On 
Truman's August 7th announcement that the bomb dropped on Hiroshima had been atomic, the 
Emperor's cabinet met ( without the Emperor, as they were a separate entity ) and wasted the day 
bickering.  Speaking both in terms of ending the war and in terms of the Japanese saving face, 
Foreign Minister Togo argued that the new atom bomb: "drastically alters the whole military 
situation and offers the military ample grounds for ending the war."   War Minister Korechika 
Anami did not concur: "Such a move is uncalled for... We do not yet know if the bomb was 
atomic."   This is a relatively reasonable response as yet.  Yet the next day, on August 8, the 
Emperor and cabinet nearly simultaneously received the news that Russia had invaded 
Manchuria and a definite confirmation that the Hiroshima bomb had been atomic.  Hirohito, 
speaking on August 9th only to those members of his cabinet who were arguing to end the war, 
before news of the Nagasaki bombing: "Since the nation can no longer continue this struggle 
with this weapon opposing it, Japan should not miss the chance for peace by vain efforts to 
secure better terms." 
	Before the Nagasaki bomb, the lines are clearly set.  The Emperor and the reasonable 
part of the cabinet are determined to end the war as soon as possible, and the militarists are 
starting into the ridiculous.  Day One on the effect of the Nagasaki bomb on the cabinet:

"It was as though the militarists in the room had not heard.  They had been shaken by the news of 
the Soviet invasion - more so than by the news of either atomic bomb - yet they fiercely resisted 
any idea of surrender..." 

Nothing the Americans could do was going to shake the militarists' belief.  General Yoshijoro 
Umezu, chief of the Army General Staff, speaking after news of the Nagasaki bombing: "With 
luck we will be able to repulse the invaders before they land ... I can say with confidence that we 
will be able to destroy the major part of an invading force."   Obviously the Japanese were 
completely incapable of destroying an invading convoy of American fighters and bombers: Japan 
was completely dominated in the air ever since Pearl Harbor.   In addition, Umezu speaks of 
stopping a landing, which is not a requirement of an atomic bomb drop.  War Minister Anami 
claimed that the Army would not surrender unless it could remain completely intact during 
occupation, conduct its own war crimes trials and its own later disarmament, concluding by 
shouting through tears: "If not, we must continue fighting with courage and find life in death!" .  
	Those who needed to be convinced in order to bring about a Japanese surrender  ( 
Hirohito and some cabinet members ) had been convinced before news of Nagasaki.  Those who 
weren't convinced by Nagasaki were incapable of being convinced by any action of war.  Finally, 
the Emperor himself sat in on a cabinet meeting, and, after sampling some more useless 
bickering and pointless advice, made a short speech concurring with those who wanted to 
surrender immediately and left the bunker where the meeting was being held.  The decision to 
surrender was made unanimous within minutes of his exit, and the last signature went on the 
proclamation at 2:30 am, August 10.   Nagasaki hurried nothing.
	We have seen that the U.S. bombing of Nagasaki was made by an uninformed and 
punitive Truman, hurried forward and carried out by a even more vengeful Groves, and in 
general ignored and unopposed by all those whose inclinations should have been to stop it.  
Having shown the intentions to be badly misguided, we see that the result of the decision was a 
pointless destruction and loss of human life that had no bearing on the end of the war and 
achieved noone's revenge.  Most likely this unfortunate waste happened because the war had 
dragged on for so long and because we were used to our enemies being easily denounced as 'evil' 
on the European front.  This sense that we were 'fighting the good fight' carried over to Japan, 
where, while imperialism was still present, a holocaust was not.  People and nations alike should 
always keep in mind exactly who and what they are fighting, and who and what their attacks will 
actually hit, instead of what happened here: a nation of civilians became the punching bad for an 
infuriated nation with a burdensome destructive power.



Bibliography

Smyth, Henry DeWolf.  Atomic Energy.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945.

Grew, Joseph C.  Report From Tokyo.
New York: Simon and Schuster, 1942.

Chinnock, Frank W.  Nagasaki: The Forgotten Bomb.
New York and Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1946.

Wyden, Peter.  Day One, Before Hiroshima and After.
New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984.

Hershey, John.  Hiroshima.
New York: Bantam Books, 1946.

Goodchild, Peter.  J. Robert Oppenheimer, Shatterer of Worlds.
Boston: Houghout Miflin Company, 1981